ABSTRACT: In the late stages of long bull markets, a popular question arises: What steps can an investor take to mitigate the impact of the inevitable large equity correction? Hedging equity portfolios is notoriously difficult and expensive. In this article, the authors analyze the performance of different tools that investors could deploy. For example, continuously holding short-dated S&P 500 put options is the most reliable defensive method but also the most costly strategy. Holding safe-haven US Treasury bonds produces a positive carry but may be an unreliable crisis-hedge strategy because the post-2000 negative bondequity correlation is a historical rarity. Long gold and long credit protection portfolios sit between puts and bonds in terms of both cost and reliability. Dynamic strategies that performed well during past drawdowns include futures time-series momentum (which benefits from extended equity sell-offs) and a quality strategy that takes long (short) positions in the highest (lowest) quality company stocks (which benefits from a flight-toquality effect during crises). The authors examine both large equity drawdowns and recessions. They also provide some out-of-sample evidence of the defensive performance of these strategies relative to an earlier, related article.
TOPICS: Equity portfolio management, options, risk management, performance measurement* T he typical investment portfolio is highly concentrated in equities, leaving investors vulnerable to large drawdowns. We examine the performance of a number of candidate defensive strategies, both active and passive, between 1985 and 2018, with a particular emphasis on the eight worst drawdowns (instances in which the S&P 500 fell by more than 15%) and three US recessions. To guard against overfitting, we provide out-of-sample evidence of the performance of these strategies in the 2018Q4 drawdown that occurred after we wrote an earlier, related article. 1 We begin with two passive strategies, both of which benefit directly from a falling equity market. A strategy that buys, and then rolls, one-month S&P 500 put options performs well in each of the eight equity drawdown periods. However, it is very costly during the normal times that constitute 86% of our sample and during expansionary (non-recession) times, which constitute 93% of our observations. As such, passive option protection seems too expensive to be a viable crisis hedge. A strategy that is long credit protection (short credit risk) also benefits during each of the eight equity drawdown periods, but in a more uneven manner, doing particularly well during the 2007 -2009 See Cook et al. (2017) .
The Best of Strategies for the Worst of Times: Can Portfolios Be Crisis Proofed?
July 2019 which was a credit crisis. Nevertheless, the credit protection strategy is less costly during normal times and non-recessions than the put buying strategy.
Next, we consider so-called safe-haven investments. A strategy that holds long positions in 10-year US Treasuries performed well in the post-2000 equity drawdowns, but it was less effective during previous equity sell-offs. This is consistent with the negative bond-equity correlation witnessed post-2000, which is atypical from the longer historical perspective. As we move beyond the extreme monetary easing that has characterized the post-Financial Crisis period, it is possible that the bond-equity correlation may revert to the previous norm, rendering a long bond strategy a potentially unreliable crisis hedge. A long gold strategy generally performs better during crisis periods than at normal times, consistent with its reputation as a safe-haven security. However, its appeal as a crisis hedge is diminished by the fact that its long-run return, measured over the 1985-2018 period, is close to zero and that it carries substantial idiosyncratic risk unrelated to equity markets. In addition, extended historical evidence presented by Erb and Harvey (2013) suggests that gold is an unreliable equity and business cycle hedge.
We then turn our attention to dynamic strategies. Certain active strategies-such as shorting currency carry or taking long positions in on-the-run Treasury bonds against short positions in off-the-run bonds-may perform well during crisis periods, but they are expensive in the long term. Given the costs of managing active strategies, we choose to focus only on those that are, at the least, positive in expectation before costs: time-series momentum and a long-short quality strategy.
Time-series momentum strategies add to winning positions (ride winners) and reduce losing positions (cut losers), much like a dynamic replication of an option straddle strategy (see Hamill, Rattray, and Van Hemert 2016) . 2 We show that such strategies performed well over the eight equity drawdowns and three recessions. We also explore limitations on the equity exposure (no long positions allowed), which we find enhances the crisis performance.
Next, we consider long-short US equity strategies. A review of the factors proposed in the academic literature suggests that those that take long positions in 2 Also see, for example, Kaminski (2011). high-quality and short positions in low-quality companies are most promising as crisis hedges because they benefit from f lights to quality when panic hits markets. The definition of a quality business is, of course, open to debate. However, broadly speaking, such companies will be profitable, be growing, have safer balance sheets, and run investor-friendly policies in areas such as payout ratios. We examine a host of quality metrics and illustrate the importance of a beta-neutral (common in practice) rather than a dollar-neutral (common in academic studies) portfolio construction.
Finally, we show that futures time-series momentum strategies and quality long-short equity strategies are not only conceptually different but also have historically uncorrelated returns, meaning that they can act as complementary crisis-hedge components within a portfolio. We demonstrate the efficacy of the dynamic hedges through some portfolio simulations.
CRISIS PERFORMANCE OF PASSIVE INVESTMENTS
We begin by identifying the eight worst equity drawdowns and three recessions for the United States in the 34-year period from 1985 to 2018. Next, we consider a number of passive, buy-and-hold strategies, including ones that hold futures contracts that are rolled according to some predefined schedule. We first analyze strategies that should logically benefit from falling firm valuations, such as a long put option and a short credit investment, and explore how they perform during these crises. This investigation is followed by a discussion of how a long safe-haven (bond or gold) position fares during equity crises, including an analysis of the bondequity correlation since 1900 and the gold-equity correlation post-Bretton Woods.
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Crisis Definitions
Exhibit 1 shows the cumulative total return of the S&P 500 (top line) using daily data from 1985 to 2018.
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A log scale is used, so a straight line corresponds to a constant rate of return, aiding the comparison of the severity of drawdown periods at different points in time. In this article, we focus on the eight periods in which the S&P 500 lost more than 15% from its peak, with the corresponding peak-to-trough periods shown in gray in Exhibit 1. We also label the last three US recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 4 For the 1988-2018 period, daily total returns are available from Bloomberg. Prior to 1988, we use data on daily index percent changes (excluding dividends) and monthly total returns (including dividends), and we proxy the daily total return as the daily index percentage change plus the monthly dividend return spread equally over the days of the month.
Exhibit 2 provides a more detailed analysis, which includes returns, peak and trough dates, lengths of the drawdowns, and whether the peak was an all-time high or a local high. The bursting of the tech bubble and the Financial Crisis are the most severe equity crises, with the S&P 500 losing about half of its value. The drawdown around 1987's Black Monday was also severe, with a -32.9% return in less than two months. The remaining equity sell-offs are associated with the first Gulf War, the Asian financial crisis (and the ruble devaluation and Long-Term Capital Management collapse), two episodes of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, and the 2018Q4 sell-off. which provides an apples-to-apples comparison to the defensive strategies.
In Exhibit 3, we report results for recessions, which do not exactly overlap with S&P 500 drawdown periods. For the Gulf War period, the recession includes the stock market rebound, and the S&P 500 is actually up over the full recession period. For the tech bubble burst, the recession period just covers a small part of the lengthy S&P 500 drawdown period. Only for the Financial Crisis do the recession and stock market drawdown periods mostly overlap.
Using the NBER definitions, only 8% of the sample is in recession. The annualized S&P 500 return e x H i b i t 3 In this subsection, we consider passive hedging strategies that directly benefit when equity value decreases: a long put option strategy and a short credit risk strategy.
Performance over Recession Periods
A rolling long put option strategy is perhaps the most direct hedge against equity drawdowns because it explicitly protects against the risk of a sudden, severe equity market sell-off. Various other equity derivatives may also be usefully considered for crisis hedges, most notably variance and volatility swaps, owing to the inverse relationship between equity returns and equity volatility. Although only traded over the counter, these swaps can be liquid and can be entered on a forward-starting basis (see, for example, Demeterfi et al. 1999) . However, because these are all somewhat related, we have focused only on the most straightforward option-based strategy for this analysis.
To evaluate how a long put investment performs during the eight identified drawdowns and in normal times, we look at the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) S&P 500 PutWrite Index, for which we have daily returns starting in 1986. The index tracks the performance of selling one-month at-the-money S&P 500 put options each month and holding them until expiry, at which point new options are sold. Positions are sized such that the options are fully collateralized at all times. Then, even if the S&P 500 goes to zero, the obligation toward the put option buyer can be honored. Because we are interested in the returns of buying puts, rather than selling puts, we use the negative of the index's excess returns. 7 An investor's portfolio includes her human capital. A drawdown of X in a recession might be worse than a drawdown of 2X in a non-recession if, for example, the investor potentially loses her job during the recession or is faced with lower income.
8 Asvanunt, Nielsen, and Villalon (2015) considered various ways to hedge the equity tails of a 60/40 portfolio, including option We also examine (in the appendix) the performance of out-of-the money puts in a shorter sample.
Exhibits 1 and 2 show that the long put strategy performs well in all eight large equity drawdowns (100% hit rate). However, the performance is not evenly spread over these episodes but rather appears to be earned in short periods of time, such as October 2008, when the equity sell-off suddenly accelerated. Once a drawdown has begun, the subsequent rolls of the options become more expensive as implied volatility rises, increasing the cost of the hedge. This effect then requires accelerated price decreases to produce the same hedge return.
Exhibit 3 details the performance of the long put strategy during the three recessions in our sample. The recession period returns for this strategy are lower mainly because equity returns in the Gulf War recession were positive.
The main concern with this strategy is its longterm overall cost. During the whole sample (equity crisis and normal), the long put strategy's annualized excess return is -7.4%. An equal-weighted combination of a long S&P 500 investment and the long put strategy has a negative excess return in each of the eight crises and a negative overall excess return. Including the transaction costs of trading options (which are relatively expensive to trade) would make the return of this strategy even more negative, underlining our observation that it is an expensive strategy.
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As a robustness check, we show in the Appendix that using monthly data since 1996 from a leading broker for over-the-counter S&P 500 puts leads to similar results. These additional data also allow us to study 5% and 10% out-of-the-money put options. Although out-of-the-money puts are cheaper than (collar) strategies.
9 Various approaches could be taken to mitigate the strategy's costs, but their benefits need to be carefully weighed against any loss of hedge efficacy, an examination that is beyond the scope of this article. First, one can generate income by selling out-of-themoney options, such as through put spreads or collars. Second, one can purchase protection where it is cheapest by analyzing the cost across strikes, across tenors, or across markets. Third, one could employ a timing approach: buying more protection at times of stress and buying less when conditions are loose. This might involve measuring market conditions (e.g., along the lines of the Chicago Fed's National Financial Conditions Index). Alternatively, one could forecast realized volatility directly using a statistical model (e.g., Shepherd and Sheppard 2010) and then increase protection ahead of expected volatility spikes and the associated increased probability of market falls.
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July 2019 at-the-money puts on a per-unit basis, they provide a worse cost-benefit trade-off if one factors in that they do not provide much of a payoff during more gradual, prolonged drawdowns.
Long credit protection strategies have generally benefited during drawdowns as the spreads between corporate and Treasury bond yields widen. It is generally more difficult, in the case of credit strategies, to accurately simulate historical returns going back to 1985 because many reliable indexes were introduced later in our sample. We use the BofA Merrill Lynch US Corp Master Total Return index, which tracks the performance of US investment-grade corporate bonds. Index returns in excess of duration-matched Treasury bonds are available from 1997. Our passive investment uses the negative of these returns. For earlier years, using a rolling one-year window, we measured the beta of the index to US 10-year Treasury futures. The excess returns of this strategy are the beta-adjusted returns of the Treasury futures minus the excess returns of the credit index. As a final step, we scaled the returns ex post to achieve a volatility of 10% across the whole sample. This is based on what we feel is the reasonable assumption that leverage can be applied, without capital borrowing requirements.
10
From a practical point of view, although it may be hard to short a large amount of corporate bonds (particularly during a crisis), one may instead obtain a short credit risk exposure using credit default swaps, like with the synthetic CDX index.
11 One consideration, which we do not attempt to address here, is that during a major crisis there may be other risks that affect any credit strategy, such as the reliability of mark-to-market pricing and heightened counterparty risk.
Similar to the put strategy, the credit strategy appears to have had negative returns on average outside of equity market drawdown periods. Drawdown period returns in Exhibit 2 are similar in scale to those of the put strategy. The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis-which was primarily a credit crisis-was a particularly profitable episode for the strategy (128% return). Unfortunately, the subsequent drawdown was equally large and swift. Over the whole sample, the credit strategy has an annualized return of -3.6%, consistent with the interpretation that it is short a risk premium (see Luu and Yu 2011) . It is noted, however, that Exhibit 1 shows the strategy has been on a pronounced downward drift since 2000. Based on our trading experience, we expect the transaction costs of implementing a short credit risk strategy through synthetic indexes such as CDX to be less than 0.1% per year.
Exhibit 3 shows that the credit strategy produced a large positive return in the 2007-2009 recession and small negative returns in the other two recessions. Comparing the long put option and short credit risk strategies, long puts should intuitively be more reliable because they are more directly linked to the equity value they aim to hedge. However, the long put strategy appears to come at a higher cost in terms of negative long-term returns. In other words, investors face a tradeoff between reliability and cost of the hedge.
Hedging with Safe-Haven Assets: Long Bonds and Long Gold
Government bonds and gold are often described as safe-haven assets.
12 A long bond position is sometimes viewed as a crisis hedge, possibly based on the perception that the government bonds of advanced economies are safe-haven securities. We show the performance of a long 10-year US Treasury investment in Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. Returns are based on 10-year Treasury futures contracts.
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In the 1985-2018 period, bonds performed well, helped by the compression in 10-year yields, from double-digit levels in the mid-1980s to around 2% in recent years. The annualized return over cash for equity drawdown periods is 10.6% in Exhibit 2, which exceeds the still positive value of 3.1% for normal periods. However, it is only during the drawdowns after 2000 that bonds performed well. During the earlier drawdowns, the performance of bonds was mixed, and over the Black Monday period, the bond return was -8.3%. The bond performance is consistently positive during the three recessions detailed in Exhibit 3.
The recent shift in bond-equity return correlations is consistent with the fact that the recent performance of bonds during equity drawdown periods exceeds that of earlier times. That is to say, since 2000, when stock prices have fallen, Treasuries have rallied. To explore further the long-term evidence, we looked at monthly returns extending our sample using returns from Global Financial Data. for the US equity index and Treasury bond returns. Exhibit 4 (Panel A) shows the rolling five-year bond-equity correlation. We see that, although the correlation was negative after 2000, it was positive for most of the preceding 100 years. This finding is in line with studies that argue that common fundamental factors would typically imply a positive bond-equity correlation (see, for example, Baele, Bekaert, and Inghelbrecht 2010). Funnell (2017) provided a similar long-term perspective of the bond-equity relationship for the United Kingdom.
Another approach to analyzing this effect is to take three subsamples of the 1960-2018 period, each around 20 years long, and then sort the three-month bond returns into quintiles based on the equity return.
14 Quintile one represents the periods with the worst equity returns; quintile five denotes the periods with the best equity returns. Exhibit 4 (Panel B) plots the annualized average bond return for the five quintiles. Consistent with the positive bond-equity correlation before 2000, a long bond position does not provide a drawdown hedge before 2000. In fact, bond returns are negative in quintile one (the worst periods for equities) for both the 1960-1979 and 1980-1999 periods. Given the economic reasons why stocks and bonds should be positively correlated and the empirical evidence, investors should pause. It is not clear whether bonds in the future will deliver the type of hedge they provided in the Financial Crisis.
Gold has long been viewed as the original safehaven asset, a source of absolute value in an uncertain world, whose price rises with increased risk aversion in markets. Gold does not provide a dividend, but, as a real asset, it can help offer protection against certain sources of long-term inf lation. Gold is typically priced in US dollars (and all subsequent analyses follow this convention), and so its price is partly driven by f luctuations in foreign exchange rates. This then links gold to US monetary policy. For example, a hawkish shift in policy may lead to a rise in the dollar (on a trade-weighted basis) and a subsequent fall in the gold price. A related scenario under which gold may benefit is a significant loss of confidence in fiat currencies, a tail risk in the true sense of the expression. However, gold is also subject to significant idiosyncratic risk (e.g., miners' strikes and political instability in mining regions), which may make it an unreliable hedge in many circumstances.
We use gold futures for the excess returns shown in Exhibits 2 and 3. Gold has positive returns in seven of the eight equity drawdowns, with an annualized return of 9.0% during equity market drawdowns. Outside of equity drawdown periods, gold returns were negative on average, leading to a full-sample performance that is marginally better than f lat. Gold's hedging ability is less clear for recessions; positive returns are recorded for only two of the three recessions in Exhibit 3. Based on our trading experience, we expect the annual transaction costs for maintaining a bond or gold exposure through futures to be below 0.1% per year.
In the online supplement, we take a longer view of gold, as we did with bonds in Exhibit 4, and find that from 1972 (after Bretton Woods) to 1984 the goldequity correlation is slightly positive. From 1985, gold has performed well during the worst equity market environments. Indeed, during this period, there is a strong correlation between gold and bonds. Erb and Harvey (2013) extended the analysis back by hundreds of years. Their evidence suggests that gold is an unreliable crisis hedge and an unreliable unexpected inf lation hedge. Although gold has kept its buying power over millennia (the real return is zero), the large amount of idiosyncratic noise means that holding periods need to be measured not in years but in centuries.
ACTIVE HEDGING STRATEGIES: TIMES-SERIES MOMENTUM
We now examine the performance of an active strategy, time-series momentum, applied to 50 futures and forward markets, during equity market drawdown and recession periods. 15 We explore both an unconstrained strategy and one in which equity exposures are capped at zero (no long equity positions), given that a long equity position will not be a useful hedge in an equity drawdown. As before, the performance is reported gross of transaction costs. We estimate the combined transaction 15 Although commodity trading advisors may often use moving-average crossovers, Levine and Pedersen (2015) showed that these are very similar to the time-series momentum strategies that we use in this article.
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July 2019 and slippage costs of implementing a three-month momentum strategy to be 0.6%-0.8% per annum. 
A Simple Time-Series Momentum Strategy
We define a simple futures time-series momentum signal as the compound return over the past N days, scaled by volatility: 
where − R t i k is the daily return of security k at time t -1 and σ −1 t k is the standard deviation of the past 100 daily returns for security k observed at time t -1, which is multiplied by N to achieve an approximate unit standard deviation for the signal.
17
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider 1-, 3-, and 12-month momentum strategies to capture short-, medium-, and long-term momentum trading. That is, N in [1] is set to 22, 65, and 261 days, respectively.
We divide the momentum score by the standard deviation of security returns to calculate a risk-adjusted market target allocation. The strategy performance is then given by multiplying the market target allocations by a gearing factor and the next period's return and then summing across securities:
The gearing factor is chosen such that we target an annualized volatility of 10% and allocate risk to six groups as follows: 25% currencies, 25% equity indexes, 25% fixed income, and 8.3% to each of agricultural products, energies, and metals. Within each group, markets are allocated equal risk. Gearing factors are calculated at the group-level using an expanding window.
To prevent the strategy from increasing overall portfolio equity beta, we follow Hamill, Rattray, and Van Hemert (2016; henceforth HRV) and consider an extension of the strategy, whereby positions in each equity market are capped at zero (only zero or short equity positions are acceptable). Like HRV, we rescale the position-capped strategy return series to achieve the same realized volatility as the unconstrained strategy and, as such, effectively redistribute some of the equity risk allocation to the other asset classes. That is, we consider the following:
• Unconstrained: as defined in Equation 1 with no further limits to the equity exposure. 17 We also follow industry practice and restrict the signal value to between -2 and 2 to prevent putting too much weight on outliers. We omit this step from the formula for ease of exposition.
• EQ position cap: positions in equities are capped at zero.
We scale the returns of each strategy (ex post) to 10% annualized volatility to allow for fair comparison. 18 We study the empirical performance of the different strategies using the 50 liquid futures and forwards from Cook et al. (2017) . This dataset covers commodities (six agricultural, six energy, and seven metal contracts), 9 currencies (all against the US dollar), 10 equities, 9 bonds, and 3 interest rate contracts.
Performance of Futures Time-Series Momentum Strategies
We report the total return of the time-series strategies for equity drawdowns in Exhibit 2 and for recessions in Exhibit 3. The one-and three-month unconstrained strategies have tended to perform well during equity crises, consistent with HRV, who argued that faster trend strategies are particularly good at providing potential crisis alpha and during recessions.
On the other hand, the 12-month unconstrained strategy has negative returns during the three most recent equity drawdowns (where the 2018Q4 sell-off can be considered out of sample, per our previous discussion) and performs notably less well during recessions.
The EQ position cap strategy performs better during equity drawdowns. In the cases of 3-and 12-month momentum, this comes at the cost of a 1.1% and 0.9% lower overall performance (per annum), respectively, compared to the unconstrained strategy.
In Exhibit 5, we report the average 5-, 22-, 65-, and 261-day return (not annualized) of three-month momentum strategies for different equity quintiles based on 5-, 22-, 65-, and 261-day windows. These statistics were derived without reference to our equity drawdown periods and so offer additional insight into the strategies' performance when equity markets fall. Unsurprisingly, the EQ position cap strategy outperforms the unconstrained strategy in the worst equity market quintile and underperforms in the best equity market quintile.
Summarizing, medium-term time-series momentum strategies have performed well during recent crisis periods (including 2018Q4) and over our full sample.
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Notes: The authors report the average 5-, 22-, 65-, and 261-day return of the S&P 500 and unconstrained and EQ position cap futures times-series momentum strategies by S&P 500 return quintiles. The momentum strategies are scaled to 10% annualized volatility (ex post). The data are from 1985 to 2018.
Restricting the long equity exposures seems to increase the crisis performance potential of these strategies but comes at a cost in terms of overall performance.
ACTIVE HEDGING STRATEGIES: QUALITY STOCKS
We now turn to a second active strategy: longshort US equity strategies that use quality metrics. Performance is reported gross of transaction costs. Based on our live experience, we estimate that the combined transaction, slippage, and financing costs of implementing the composite quality strategies amounts to around 1.0%-2.0% per annum. Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2019; henceforth AFP) argued that, although quality stocks logically deserve a higher price-to-book ratio, in reality they do not always exhibit such a premium. In particular, toward the end of equity bull markets, quality stocks have often looked underpriced. Then, when the market has a drawdown, these stocks have outperformed, benefitting from the so-called f light-to-quality effect.
Motivation to Look at Quality Stocks
Using the Gordon growth model, AFP derived the following formula for the price-to-book (P/B) ratio 19 :
Profitability Payout ratio Required return Growth
Each of the four components on the right-hand side of Equation 3 is a quality metric that can be measured in several ways, such as 12 The Best of Strategies for the Worst of Times: Can Portfolios Be Crisis Proofed?
July 2019 1. Profitability: profits (gross profits, earnings, cash f lows) scaled by an accounting value (book equity, book assets, sales) 2. Growth: trailing five-year growth of a profitability measure 3. Safety (required return): safer companies command lower required returns; return-based measures include market beta and volatility, and fundamental-based measures include low leverage, low volatility of profitability, and low credit risk 4. Payout: the fraction of profits paid out to shareholders, which can be seen as a measure of the shareholder friendliness of management
The literature finds that many of these metrics have some ability to predict cross-sectional stock returns.
Evidence from Other Popular Factors
We start our analysis by using publicly available daily returns to evaluate the performance of factors documented in the literature. In Exhibit 6, we present results for the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model (the first five factors) and factor returns based on AFP and other researchers (the last three factors). 20 Only US stocks are considered in each case.
Quality and profitability (in itself a component of quality) stand out in terms of their performance over equity market drawdown periods (Panel A) and recessions (Panel B). It is important to note that these factors are constructed in a dollar-neutral way, which is common practice in the literature. In the case of the quality factor, however, this leads to a negative correlation of -0.48 to the S&P 500, based on fiveday overlapping returns. This raises the question of whether the positive drawdown-period performance is simply explained by the negative equity exposure.
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The subsequent subsections present evidence that suggests this is not the case.
Also noteworthy for its return during equity drawdowns is the stock momentum factor, which in this case is traded at the stock level and in a cross-sectional (dollar-neutral) fashion and so differs from the futures time-series momentum discussed previously. However, some of the intuition behind futures trend-following providing crisis alpha (see HRV) may carry over to stock momentum. For example, stock momentum may pick up sector trends that ref lect the broader macro movements, which are also picked up by futures trend-following. The investment factor, which goes long the stock of conservative companies with low growth in book assets while shorting aggressive, high-asset-growth companies, performs about as well as the stock momentum factor during equity drawdowns.
In contrast, the value factor has been much less effective as an equity market drawdown hedge than the quality and profitability factors. In general, a profitability factor is the ratio of two accounting values (e.g., the ratio of net income to the book value of equity), and as such the positioning is unaffected by the short-term gyrations of the equity market. A value factor is the ratio of an accounting value and a market value (e.g., the ratio of net income to the market value of equity). Hence, a value metric will change more favorably for stocks that underperform the market, causing the factor to increase its exposure to such stocks.
Individual Quality Factor Performance
In this subsection, we evaluate various quality metrics. Exhibit 7 lists all the signals we consider, which form a subset of AFP's signals; we omit Ohlson's O and Altman's Z (which are more highly parameterized than the others) and instead focus on return-and leveragebased safety measures.
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At each date, the raw signal value, s, is ranked cross sectionally, r(s) = rank s; then a cross-sectional z-score is determined, z(r) = (r -m r )/s r , where m r is the cross-sectional mean and s r is the cross-sectional standard deviation. The key purpose of this ranking step is to reduce the impact of outliers. This robustness step can be a relevant precaution when working with accounting data. Denoting the signal arising from this first step time at t 
where
The beta is computed with respect to the S&P 500 using five-day overlapping returns over the past three years. Strategy returns are obtained by multiplying the final signal values, lagged by a day, with stock returns:
In a final step, we scale strategy returns (ex post) such that the full-sample realized volatility is 10%, merely to aid comparison across various definitions of quality and with the futures time-series momentum strategies.
We evaluate the performance of the quality factors in a universe of mid-and large-cap US stocks. Each month, we define a market cap threshold: Those stocks that exceed it are defined as large-cap and those that do not are mid-cap. This threshold is set equal to $2 billion e x H i b i t 7
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Notes: The authors list the various quality factors used in our strategies. All fundamental data are from Worldscope.
at the end of 2016 (and onward), and for earlier dates it is suitably def lated. 23 As an example, the threshold in 1986 was about $200 million. This results in a sample with lower turnover, with the number of constituents ranging between 951 and 1,611 over our analysis.
Exhibit 8, Panel A, reports the drawdown-and normal-period performance for the different quality factors. As a result of data availability, some factors have returns missing for the first one or two equity drawdowns. For most factors, the annualized drawdownperiod return is higher than the return during normal periods, suggesting a crisis-hedge property. A first notable exception, however, is the set of growth factors, for which the drawdown-period performance is worse than the normal performance in three of six cases; moreover, the overall performance is around zero for all six growth factors.
A second exception is the low beta factor. A betaneutral implementation of the low beta factor in effect means leveraging the long positions in low beta stocks. This tends to lead to better overall performance but worse drawdown-period performance because strategies with embedded leverage underperform when funding constraints tighten (Frazzini and Pedersen 2014) , which often occurs at times of market stress (as in the Financial Crisis). In contrast, a beta-neutral, lowidiosyncratic-volatility strategy does not involve as much leveraging of the long positions and, indeed, still historically performs well during crises.
During recession periods, reported in Exhibit 8, Panel B, results are a bit more mixed, but some profitability and payout factors show a notably stronger performance during recessions compared to expansionary periods.
In the online supplement, we report results for dollar-neutral versions of the strategies, which can be constructed by setting all beta estimates to unity in Equation 4. Constructing the strategies in this way can lead to negative correlations with the S&P 500. The low beta factor provides an extreme example with a correlation of -0.73. Dollar-neutral implementations are commonplace in many published papers (e.g., see AFP) but leave open the possibility that a good performance over equity drawdown periods can be attributed to negative equity exposure, rather than being a positive convex function of the equity market return. We are mostly interested in positive convexity, with a factor performing well during equity bear markets and not performing badly during equity bull markets.
Composite Quality Factor Performance
Exhibits 2 and 3 present the performance of composite factors for both dollar-neutral and beta-neutral portfolios. Composites are determined at each point in time by averaging the (ranked and z-scored) score of a stock across multiple factors and then re-ranking and z-scoring these averages across stocks.
In Exhibit 2, we see that profitability, payout, safety, and a grand composite of the four quality composites, denoted quality all, performed well during equity market drawdowns and for the full sample. Only the growth composite stands out as performing poorly during both equity market drawdown and normal periods. In Exhibit 3, we see that the annualized performance during recessions is strong for profitability but not for safety.
In the online supplement, we report the output of a regression of the different quality composites on the market, size, value, and momentum factors. The main result is that quality composites capture anomalies beyond these control factors. Also noteworthy is that, except for growth, all composites have a negative beta to the size factor.
24 Profitability and growth have a negative beta to the value factor, whereas payout and safety have a positive beta to value. The exposure to the crosssectional equity momentum factor is small in all cases.
In Exhibit 9, we report the return (not annualized) of quality composites for different equity quintiles based on 5-, 22-, 65-, and 261-day windows, as we did in the previous section for the futures time-series momentum strategies. The quintile analysis does not depend on our choice of equity drawdown periods and, as such, provides an alternative view of the defensive property. Profitability, payout, safety, and quality all perform best in the worst equity quintile for each of the four horizons.
CAN PORTFOLIOS BE CRISIS PROOFED?
In Exhibit 10, we present correlations between a selected subset of the strategies considered earlier. The July 2019 futures time-series momentum strategies (1-, 3-, and 12-month momentum with equity positions capped at zero) demonstrate negligible correlation with any of the quality stock strategies (profitability, payout, growth, safety, and the grand quality composite). Hence, timeseries momentum and quality stocks are complementary defensive strategies.
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To investigate the effectiveness of dynamic strategies in providing returns during equity market drawdown periods and recessions, we simulated portfolios with varying allocations to the S&P 500, three-month momentum with no long equity positions, and the quality composite factor strategy. In a first step, we deduct transaction costs from the momentum and quality strategies. We assumed the midpoints of our ear- 25 The low correlation between futures time-series momentum and quality stocks also is obtained when considering only equity market drawdown periods or only normal periods. lier estimates, so 0.7% per annum for momentum and 1.5% per annum for quality. Second, we scale up returns (after costs) of the hedge strategies so that they achieve 15% volatility when combined. This higher volatility is closer to the long-run historical volatility of equities. Based on the authors' experience, the combined hedge portfolio can be implemented at this leverage without any additional funding.
The simulated portfolios allocate some proportion of capital to the combined hedge portfolio and the remaining capital to the S&P 500. Hence, a hedge proportion of 30% implies a 70% allocation to the S&P 500 and a 30% allocation to the hedge portfolio. Statistics for these portfolios are shown in Exhibit 11 (Panel A for equity drawdowns and Panel B for recessions). Although a 50% allocation to the hedge strategy is required to achieve a positive return over the equity market drawdown periods in our simulations, a 10% allocation improves the return e x H i b i t 1 0 in each of the eight historical equity market drawdown periods, resulting in more than a seven percentage point improvement in the annualized drawdown-period return (from -44.3% to -36.8%).
Correlation between Strategies Considered in Previous Sections
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Can a portfolio be crisis proofed? Possibly yes, but at a very high cost. We show that a passive strategy that continually holds put options on the S&P 500 is prohibitively expensive, leading to a return drag of more than 7% per year. A strategy that passively holds US 10-year Treasuries is an unreliable crisis hedge, given that the post-2000 negative bond-equity correlation is historically atypical. Long gold and short credit risk sit between puts and bonds in terms of both cost and reliability, according to our research.
To reduce the cost of crisis protection, we evaluated a number of dynamic strategies for their potential to perform well during the worst equity market drawdowns as well as recessions.
Two conceptually different classes of strategies emerge as credible candidates in our view. First, futures time-series momentum strategies, which resemble a dynamic replication of long straddle positions, performed well during both severe equity market drawdowns and recessions. Restricting these strategies from taking long equity positions further enhances their protective properties but comes at the cost of lower overall performance.
Second, strategies that take long and short positions in single stocks, using quality metrics to rank companies cross sectionally, have also historically performed well when equity markets have sold off and during recessions, likely a result of a f light-to-quality effect. We analyzed e x H i b i t 1 1 a host of different quality metrics and point out the importance of using a beta-neutral portfolio construction, rather than using the dollar-neutral formulation that is more common in published papers.
Effectiveness of Dynamic Hedges
In the late stage of a bull market, it is prudent for investors to plan for the inevitable drawdown that might be accompanied by a recession. We analyze a number of passive and active strategies and detail the effectiveness of these strategies across various crises. However, investors need to be careful in defining "best" when selecting the best of strategies in the worst of times. It is essential to understand not just the performance but the overall cost of implementing various protective measures.
Every crisis is different. For each crisis, some defensive strategies will turn out to be more helpful than others. Therefore, diversification across a number of promising defensive strategies may be most prudent.
a p p e n d i x
LONG PUTS USING OVER-THE-COUNTER PUT OPTION DATA FROM A BROKER
Before, we used the CBOE S&P500 PutWrite Index, for which we have daily at-the-money (ATM) S&P 500 put returns starting in 1986. As a robustness check, here we also use mid-quote data for over-the-counter (OTC) S&P 500 put options from a large broker, which are available since 1996 and include 5% and 10% out-of-the-money (OTM) put data. Because the OTC put data are monthly, we extend our drawdown periods to span whole calendar months.
The passive strategy based on these OTC options initiates a long one-month put position at month end, and the puts are held until expiry at the subsequent month end. In contrast, the PutWrite Index positions are initiated and expire on the third Friday of the month, and the payoff at expiry is based on the special open quotation.
We f irst consider the strategy of holding one put option; that is, the return is the net payoff of one option, divided by the index level at option initiation. This mimics the PutWrite Index methodology. The return of passively investing in the OTC one-month ATM S&P 500 puts has a correlation of 0.85 to the short PutWrite Index returns, and the all-period return is similarly negative (see Exhibit A1). Both ATM option strategies generate positive returns for all drawdown periods (100% hit rate), though during the tech bubble burst, shorting the PutWrite Index performs notably better.
Turning to 5% and 10% OTM options, one can see from Exhibit A1 that the all-period return is less negative, which is intuitive given the lower premium relative to an ATM put. However, the drawdown period performance is no longer consistently positive and is mostly negative in the case of 10% OTM puts. The intuition is that these OTM puts do not pay off when there is a more gradual decline (and monthly returns do not exceed -5% and -10%, respectively).
Rather than buying a fixed number of puts, one can also spend a fixed fraction of wealth on option premiums. We consider the case of spending 1% per month. This arguably creates a more like-for-like comparison between ATM and OTM options. Furthermore, such a strategy naturally buys fewer options when they are expensive. From the bottom rows of Exhibit A1, we see that the ATM option strategy provides the best cost-benefit trade-off. This should come as no surprise because insurance against ( just) the worst states of the world commands a disproportionately high risk premium.
